While principles of cognitive science hold the promise of helping children to study more effectively, these principles have rarely been tested in applied settings and they do not always make a successful transition. These advances have come about, largely, through a plethora of exciting laboratory experiments. As a result there are a variety of memory phenomena that, in the laboratory, are both highly replicable and well understood. Deep encoding, spaced practice, testenhanced learning, the generation effect, the encoding specificity principle, the effects of difficult retrieval, the beneficial effects of spacing, judgments of learning, overconfidence and underconfidence biases, are all buzzwords within cognitive psychology that have implications for enhancing learning in a classroom situation. Our increasing understanding of people's metacognitive biases and distortions may be particularly important. But applying these principles in a real world setting frequently gives rise to unexpected issues that may modulate their effectiveness.
The last 40 years, since the cognitive revolution took hold in American psychology, have seen many advances in our understanding of how people think and remember, as well as in what they know about what they know--their metacognition.
These advances have come about, largely, through a plethora of exciting laboratory experiments. As a result there are a variety of memory phenomena that, in the laboratory, are both highly replicable and well understood. Deep encoding, spaced practice, testenhanced learning, the generation effect, the encoding specificity principle, the effects of difficult retrieval, the beneficial effects of spacing, judgments of learning, overconfidence and underconfidence biases, are all buzzwords within cognitive psychology that have implications for enhancing learning in a classroom situation. Our increasing understanding of people's metacognitive biases and distortions may be particularly important. But applying these principles in a real world setting frequently gives rise to unexpected issues that may modulate their effectiveness.
One of the most clearly applicable sets of findings are the biases and illusions in people's metacognitions. People frequently believe they have learned something when in fact they have not (Bjork, 1999; Metcalfe, 1998) . Given such metacognitive failures learners may be in a poor position to remedy their own faulty study habits. Furthermore, there are many real world situations in which the task itself destroys our metacognitions.
For example, when people try to study for a foreign language vocabulary test, the fact that the textbook presents the to-be-remembered word side by side with its translation would seem to be innocuous. But it produces exactly the condition, shown by Kelly and Jacoby (1996) , to evoke overconfidence. Because people's choice of whether to study or
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Cognitive Science in Education/ 4 not is directly related to whether they think they know or not (Metcalfe & Finn, submitted) , they will decline study because they think, wrongly, that they already know.
One way to circumvent metacognitive illusions is to encourage people to test themselves, which has benefits both because it allows for more accurate metacognition (Dunlosky, Hertzog, Kennedy, & Thiede, 2005) , and because the effects of the test are themselves beneficial (Glover, 1989; Hogan & Kintsch, 1971; Roediger & Karpicke, 2006) , perhaps because the person generates the answer actively. But without the help of either a teacher, tutor, parent, or computer, self testing can be logistically problematic, if the learner thinks of doing it at all. Educators and psychologists need to devise ways to induce people to do this, rather than allowing them to automatically fall into a dysfunctional illusory metacognitive state. On a related note, generating the answer, rather than simply reading it or having it presented, gives rise to a well-documented beneficial memory effect (Hirshman & Bjork, l988; Slamecka & Graf, 1978) . But people, in the course of book learning or in listening to a lecture, will often be in a read or passive presentation situation. Furthermore, when allowed to decide when to stop studying, people's memory performance can be worse than when the experimenter controls their timing (Kornell & Bjork, 2006) . People do not realize when extra study time will help (Koriat, 1997) . They may not spontaneously space their learning (see Benjamin & Bird, in press ), though there is abundant evidence that they should do so (Cepeda, Pashler, Vul, Wixted, & Rohrer, in press ).
For these reasons, computer-based study programs, which eliminate some or all of these problems and biases, show great promise in helping students to learn. But the question is how best to structure a computer-based study program? To begin
Cognitive Science in Education/ 5 investigating this question we devised a program to assist vocabulary learning, based on principles of cognitive science. This project will be described below, before we elaborate some of problems and issues that we encountered in the effort.
Background research: The Bronx Project
We began our work, in collaboration with teachers and principals, in an at-risk inner-city public middle school in New York City's South Bronx. The Grade 6 children who were our volunteers were at potentially high risk for school failure and a wide range of other disadvantageous behavioral and social-emotional outcomes, with very low literacy and academic performance scores. Together with the teachers, we determined a list of vocabulary words that the children needed to know to be able to read their textbooks and to understand the materials on evaluative tests. We developed a computerassisted study program that we hoped would allow metacognitive illusions to be overcome and which would implement many of the principles that we and other researchers had studied in the lab: multimodal presentation in case there were reading difficulties, spaced practice, repeated quizzing, and study time allocation based on ongoing evaluations of the children's performance. Rather than allowing the children to simply passively read or, indeed, ignore, the to-be-learned material, they had to generate the answers. The program provided applause when they were right, and corrective feedback when they were wrong. Repeated study and testing was conducted over a course of 7-8 weeks.
Each day, half of the children started on a randomly-selected subset of the to-belearned vocabulary items in a 'self study' condition, in which they had all of the standard study aids --flashcards, colored pens, papers, etc. --that they would ideally have in a At the end of 35 minutes of studying, the kids switched. Thus the children served as their own controls. At the end of the seventh week, all of the vocabulary, plus a subset that had not been studied at all, was tested.
The results were highly favorable for the cognitive-science based study program.
Performance in the computer condition was over 400% of that seen in the self-study condition (which was very low), in the first study we conducted (see Metcalfe, 2006 ) and over 600% of the self study condition in a more refined second 7-week study (see, Metcalfe, Kornell & Son, in press ). These results were encouraging to us, and we replicated them twice more--first with children from the same community learning English as a second language, and then with Columbia University students (Metcalfe et al., in press ). There was a significant benefit for the computer-based study program, with all of these groups.
Questions that arose from the Bronx Study
While we were encouraged, we had also faced a number of conundrums in developing the programs. We had had to make many decisions without sufficient knowledge. The results showed that the combination of interventions was effective, but did not allow us to identify exactly what was responsible, or whether, indeed, some procedures we had included might be harming learning.
For example, we believed, from the many studies that had shown such effects, that self-generation of the answers was crucial. Therefore, we had implemented a selfgeneration procedure even though we also knew that the children would inevitably make mistakes. We did not know how detrimental the mistakes would be. Perhaps the learners
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Cognitive Science in Education/ 7 would remember the mistakes, and the misinformation from them would become so embedded that the use of a generation procedure was not warranted. Perhaps we should have had the children generate the answers only when they were very sure and likely to be correct, rather than all of the time, as we had done. In that case, we might be able to reap the benefits of the generation procedure without suffering the (supposed) impairments due to the production of mistakes.
What we had done to offset the anticipated problem of the children learning the errors was to give feedback. We never let an error stand uncorrected. This seemed reasonable, but we did not know what the effects of feedback were. Feedback has been addressed in the domain of educational psychology (for reviews, see Bangert-Drowns, Kulik, Kulik, & Morgan, 1991; Butler & Winne, 1995) , but in the cognitive psychology literature we found a shortage of articles (but see Pashler, Cepeda, Wixted, & Rohrer, 2005 , for new research). Despite our intuitions that feedback would help, there were data showing that too much feedback impairs, rather than helps, motor-skill learning (Bjork, 1999; Schmidt & Bjork, 1992 ). Were we far enough removed from this kind of learning that feedback would be beneficial?
To address these uncertainties, we conducted several laboratory-based experiments, based on a single design, investigating the effects of free versus forced generation, errors, and feedback. It was our hope that by answering these questions, we would be able to revise the original study program to do an even better job of enhancing children's learning.
Experiments to answer the questions that arose
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The study that we designed was a 3 by 2 factorial experiment. The first factor was generate condition: free generation (i.e., generate only if confident about the answer), forced generation (generate whether certain or not), and presentation only. We were able to address the effects of committing errors with this design because in the free generate conditions we expected that there would be few errors, whereas in the forced generation condition we expected many errors. We could also address the effect of generation, by comparing the generation conditions to the presentation-only condition.
The second factor was feedback. On half of the trials feedback--showing the correct answer for 2.5 s--was given after each response. On the other half of the trials, no feedback was given. This manipulation allowed us not only to investigate the effect of feedback per se, but also to see whether feedback had a particularly important effects when the children were committing many errors. Perhaps it is only important when errors need to be corrected, but not otherwise. The differential effect of feedback in the free and forced generation conditions would allow us to tell. In the present-only condition, no additional feedback was given except the presentation of the item itself.
We conducted this experiment first with Grade 6 children in the Bronx (using definitions such as "To discuss something in order to come to an agreement: Negotiate" as teaching materials), then with Columbia University students (with more difficult materials such as "Disdainful; characterized by haughty scorn: Supercilious"), and then we replicated the experiment again with Columbia students, allowing unlimited time to study the feedback. The effects were qualitatively the same in each case, so we will present them together here.
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The procedure consisted of three phases: (1) Initial study, during which all of the definition/word pairs were presented, (2) the manipulation phase described above, and (3) a cued-recall test, in which the children tried to produce the word corresponding to each of the definitions. Each session was split into two blocks, with one block run under freegeneration conditions, the other under forced-generation conditions. The three feedback conditions (generate with feedback, generate without feedback, presentation) were mixed within each block. Since the presentation condition did not involve generation, it was the same in both blocks.
Generation. To our surprise we found that the generation conditions did not show consistently superior memory to the present conditions. Errors. We found no effect of errors. The forced generation conditions were not different from the free generation conditions, in any of the three experiments.
Feedback. In each experiment, we found a large and significant effect of feedback. Performance was higher in every experiment, and in every condition which allowed the contrast, when feedback was given. This advantage for items that were corrected when wrong answer or when no answer was given persisted even when a second study/test trial was given. The data showing the full design, collapsed over all three experiments, are shown in Figure 1 . As can be seen, only feedback mattered, but it mattered a great deal.
Follow-up studies and Implications
Self Generation. The failure to find a generation effect came as a surprise to us.
Many experiments have reported generation effects in the past (e.g., Slamecka & Graf, 1978 , as well as boundary conditions, Hirshman & Bjork, 1988; McDaniel, Waddell, & Metcalfe& Kornell Cognitive Science in Education/ 10 Einstein, l988 ), and we were highly confident of the beneficial effects of self-generating.
But confidence can be mistaken. Interestingly, deWinstanley and Bjork (2004) found a generation effect on the first trial, but by the second trial no generation effect was in evidence, a finding that they interpreted as indicating that people learned that it was efficacious to generate the answers, and did so on the second trial even in the read condition. Perhaps, similarly, in our experiments, participants were generating when they had nominally been assigned to the read-only condition. If so, it would explain the ostensible absence of a generation effect.
We, therefore, examined our own procedures more closely. Two factors seemed particularly relevant in the current experiments. First, in the read-only condition, we had tried to ensure that the participants would read the cue before they read the target by showing the cue for 1 s alone before presenting the target. In retrospect, this brief pause may have been enough to induce the participants to generate the answers even though nominally they were in the read-only condition. Second, we had presented the read and generate items intermixed within a single list. While previous research has shown generation effects in within list designs (Slamecka & Katsaiti, 1987) , we were nevertheless concerned that participants in such a design might attempt generation on every item.
To further test the idea that the brief cue-alone pause was important in allowing people to generate even in the read condition, we conducted a follow-up experiment in which in the read condition a cue and target were presented together, simultaneously, for 6 s., whereas in the quasi-generation condition, the cue word was presented alone for 3 seconds and then left visible when the target was added for another 3 s. Recall was
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Cognitive Science in Education/ 11 enhanced by presentation of the cue alone prior to the target presentation. Carrier and Pashler (1992) reported similar results. So, the small and seemingly innocuous pause that we had included only to be sure that people paid attention to the cue may have induced people to generate the answer even in the control condition.
But having failed to replicate the much-vaunted generation effect three times, we decided to verify that when there was no pause and when the generate and read items were not intermixed that we would replicate the generation effect. In two such experiments, one conducted in the Bronx and one at Columbia, we found large and significant generation effects, shown in Figure 2 .
The important pedagogical implication of the absence of a generation effect in our first three experiments, and in deWinstanley and Bjork's research, is that it might be easy for a savvy educator to produce a generation effect and thereby greatly enhance their students' learning. The read condition, in our later experiments in which a large generation effect was manifested, was such that the learner could passively read (or maybe even not read) the materials. We are inclined to suppose that in a practical situation such a method of presentation may encourage the learner's attention to flag.
Rather than spoon feeding students by laying everything out for them, it would behoove the instructor to pause from time to time, asking questions that encourage the students to generate the answers themselves--Socratic style. It would seem important to not immediately jump to the answer. A short pause, or even better, a seemingly interminable pause of several seconds, may greatly enhance learning. It may also be beneficial for the whole class, and not just the students answering, if the instructor asks individuals to answer aloud, but without saying in advance who the victim will be. Under such
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Errors. In the first three experiments, (one conducted with the Grade 6 children and two with Columbia students) we found no difference in eventual recall as a function of whether people were forced to generate their answers or whether they were free to produce only those answers about which they were highly confident. In the first experiment they produced 22.1% errors (free generation) as compared to 80.1% errors (forced generation); in the second experiment, 15.4% and 69.0% respectively; and, in the third experiment 15.2%, and 70.4%. Clearly, there was a large difference in how many errors were produced, but equally clearly, when participants were given feedback that corrected these errors, there was no difference whatsoever in their final correct recall (see Figure 1 ).
There are reasons to believe that errors should have had a negative effect. When people commit an error should it not put them into an A-B A-C interference situation, where C is the correct response and B is the error? Should the errors not produce the kind of dilemma that people face when given misinformation (Loftus & Hoffman, 1989) ? One would expect that the errors would interfere with memory for the correct items. Indeed, one might expect them to be even more harmful than the responses in the classic interference-theory paradigm or the misleading information paradigm in which the nontargeted information is merely presented to the participant. When people generate their own errors, the errors should be even more memorable-and thus detrimental-than information that is merely presented.
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Because this logic seemed so compelling, we conducted two additional experiments, one with middle school children and one with college students, in which participants were instructed to answer every question (and by necessity make errors) or to avoid errors at all costs. Neither showed an effect of errors. We have tried many times now, and have never been able to obtain a detrimental effect of producing an error, so long as corrective feedback is given.
But, you say, perhaps you have to believe in an error for it to cause a detrimental memory effect. If you produce an error that you know is wrong (because the computer program says you have to say something) perhaps it should not count as an error at all.
Perhaps only errors that you commit with high confidence--the ones you believe in--have a detrimental effect on memory.
Although this sounds plausible, the data argue against it. Butterfield and Metcalfe Where does this leave us pedagogically? Our results indicate that having students generate is a good idea, and that errors, as long as they are corrected, do not harm learning. The fear that the students might generate an error that could be detrimental to their learning the correct answer appears to be unfounded. It should not, according to our data, be used as a reason to keep students from actively generating and from participating fully in their own learning.
Feedback. Our results with respect to feedback are straightforward. Without exception, feedback had a large and important beneficial effect on learning. Most often, when no feedback was given, responses that were wrong initially simply stayed wrong.
This seems logical, and unsurprising (though worth acting on, nevertheless), since in a verbal learning situation errors rarely correct themselves spontaneously. We are currently in the process of investigating when feedback should be given, and do not yet know the answer. But we do know that feedback helps: it was the single largest factor in our results, and we strongly recommend its use. To err may be human, but giving corrective feedback is divine. 
